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The Parable of the Bees: Beyond Proximate Causes in Ecosystem Service Valuation 
 





Many ecological and environmental economists take a microeconomic approach to 
environmental valuation and view the macroeconomy as one big firm whose primary task is to 
efficiently allocate scarce resources. In this framework, replacing freely provided ecosystem 
services with costly human-provided substitutes is by definition inefficient. Using the example of 
apple tree pollination in Maoxian County, China we argue that destroying and replacing the free 
gifts of nature can be an economic benefit. We do not argue that the positive economic benefits 
justifies eliminating natural processes. On the contrary, the Maoxian case illustrates the danger 
of allowing the logic of the market to drive conservation policy.  The conflict between the 
market economy and the natural world must be recognized and addressed in a more substantial 
way. The bees of Maoxian County are a parable for the relationship between humans and the 
natural world and show clearly the danger of leaving the fate of nature to the whims of the 
markets even if prices are “correct.”  
Keywords: Biodiversity, ecosystem services, environmental valuation, market failure, natural 
capital  
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The Parable of the Bees: Beyond Proximate Causes in Ecosystem Service Valuation 
 
 “A new ethics is what the world needs most. If our values are right, everything else—





I. Introduction: The Parable of the Bees  
 
It is a commonly held belief among ecological and environmental economists that placing 
market values on ecosystems and their services is a necessary and sufficient condition for 
insuring their preservation. Underlying this view is the standard microeconomic worldview that 
humans are rational allocators of scarce resources and that environmental services are being 
misused because their true value is not reflected in market prices. In a production function 
framework the loss of environmental services harms the economy by imposing additional input 
costs that were once free gifts of nature.
2 Yet a closer look suggests that this approach to 
conservation fails to address the fundamental conflict between markets and the natural world. 
The case of bees and their pollination services nicely illustrates the inadequacy of monetizing 
ecosystem services as a conservation strategy.  
Most economists recognize that problems exist in the way the unregulated market 
economy allocates the use of the services the natural world provides. In spite of the general 
apathy toward the environment among economists
3 those specializing in environmental, 
resource, and ecological economics recognize the importance of a host of issues surrounding its 
use. Those who concentrate on ecosystem service tend to identify the problem as “market 
failure” and propose that the solution is to identify the valuable services of nature that have fallen 
through the market valuation cracks. The policy prescription is to determine the “correct” prices 
(social or shadow prices) so that these can be translated into market signals to rational agents 
who will initiate the process of efficient allocation.
4 In this vein the debates among those 4 
 
economists and ecologists who concentrate on ecosystem services generally revolve around the 
appropriate economic valuation technique to use. The economic-environment conflict is seen as 
both theoretically tractable and practically resolvable within the confines of neoclassical theory 
and the market economy.    
Those who believe the problem is primarily one of market failure (incorrect prices) are 
themselves a diverse group ranging from neoclassical environmental economists
5, ecological 
economists
6, to conservation biologists
7. This diverse group has major differences concerning the 
best valuation approach, the degree of substitutability between natural and human-manufactured 
capital, and the place of environmental ethics in environmental policy, but when it comes to the 
belief that pricing nature and its services will allow the market to allocate efficiently the three 
camps are quite similar.   
The enthusiasm for environmental service valuation arises from the underlying belief that 
once the “true” value of the contribution of the natural world to human well-being is known then 
it will be protected. But is this always the case? A highly publicized example from China 
suggests otherwise. Due to overuse of pesticides and the overharvesting of honey the population 
of bee pollinators has dramatically diminished in Maoxian County, China.  As a result apple 
trees grown there now have to be pollinated by hand. The picture of a young girl pollinating an 
apple blossom using chopsticks has become an iconic symbol of the economic costs incurred 
when the benefits of ecosystem services are lost
8.  Yet our research suggests that replacing 
ecosystem services with human labor is efficient from a microeconomic (production function) 
perspective.  Furthermore, replacing bees with human labor has the added benefit of increasing 
aggregate economic activity. Human pollinators have positive macroeconomic effects in terms of 5 
 
Keynesian multipliers, not to mention the social value of employment. Human pollinators can 
recycle income, bees cannot.    
We argue below that not only is the market valuation approach flawed, economic 
valuation in general offers only a partial explanation of the on-going catastrophic loss of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services. In suggesting an alternative we rely on Tinbergen’s
9 
distinction between proximate and ultimate causes. “Wrong prices” may be a proximate cause of 
ecosystem service losses but the ultimate cause is an ever-increasing reliance on logic of the 
market economy—an institutional arrangement that fundamentally alters the relationship of 
humans to the natural world and to each other, reducing  complex relationships to a question of 
rational allocation using relative prices. To protect nature we need to recognize the complex 
institutional landscape of creating exchange value.  The proximate-ultimate distinction offers an 
opening for environmental ethicists to enter the policy debate on an equal footing with 
economists.
10   
II. Apple Pollination and the Redundancy of Nature 
A survey completed in 2005 of apple growers in Maoxian
11 found the following: (1) 
average land holdings are very small, about 0.2 hectares, (2) farmers maintain a  small proportion 
of pollinator trees (5-7%), well below the estimated minimum requirement of 20% with wild 
pollinators, (3) apple farmers use pesticides extensively, spraying 10-15 times each season, 
killing not only bees but other natural pollinators, (4) due to the pressure of maintaining high 
yields farmers prefer hand pollination since they feel that humans can ensure that each flower is 
pollinated. The county government actively encouraged hand pollination through its extension 
service beginning in 1990. As news of the productivity increase through hand pollination spread 6 
 
throughout the county, the practice quickly spread. By 1997 almost all of the estimated 2000 
hectares of apple orchards in the area were hand pollinated. 
In January 2011 one of the authors (Chen) visited Maoxian County and conducted in-
depth interviews with the major apple growers in the region. These discussions confirmed the 
results of the earlier survey and provided additional information about the economics of using 
human labor rather than bees for pollination. Apple growers estimated that apple production is 
30-40 percent greater with human pollination as compared to relying on bees. Aside from the 
obvious benefit of pollination versus non-pollination, many apples need cross pollination which 
requires unproductive “pollinizer varieties” that are not commercially desirable and they take up 
land which could be used for more productive trees.  Human pollination by hand minimizes the 
number of pollinizer varieties needed and maximizes the number of productive commercially 
viable varieties. Furthermore, human pollinators can work in windy and rainy weather when bees 
have greater difficulty. Apple farmers prefer to use human beings because by doing so they are 
able to have a more productive orchard from the perspective of total apple production. If wage 
costs are low and the potential for productivity increases sufficiently high, then it makes 
economic sense to use people instead of bees.   
In Maoxian county replacing ecosystem services with human labor appears to be 
economically efficient and it has the additional benefit of increasing local economic activity. 
Another benefit impossible to quantify arises from the social nature of apple pollination by hand. 
The orchards are in mountainous regions with differences in elevation and the flower phase of 
every orchard differs. The different flowering times enable neighbors to help each other 
pollinate. Thus the labor “payment” is usually not in monetary terms but rather in-kind labor and 
is not so much an economic loss as it is a social benefit in terms of establishing closer 7 
 
community ties.  If the replacement of ecosystem services by humans has an undeniable 
economic logic then a reevaluation of ecosystem service valuation as a strategy for preservation 
of ecosystems is warranted.  
The Maoxian case is not unique. A different but equally intriguing situation involving 
bees, market efficiency and agricultural technology has arisen in Fresno, California where 
oranges and almonds are produced.  Almonds need bees to pollinate them and historically bee 
keepers have brought their bees to almond producing groves so their bees will have food and 
almonds will get pollinated.  The bees also pollinate oranges and make orange blossom honey.  
Since the oranges bloom after the almonds, it is convenient for bee keepers to come and stay 
until both almonds and oranges are pollinated.  But the problem is that citrus production 
technology in California is changing.  Consumers want Clementines, a seedless citrus, which 
apparently self-pollinate and are now grown in the same areas as almonds and oranges. But if the 
bees spread the pollen from oranges blossoms to Clementine blossoms the latter end up with 
seeds which defeats the whole purpose of growing them
12. Thus the pollination services of bees 
end up being an economic benefit to some and an economic liability to others. 
We recognize the value of pointing out the contributions of nature to economic output. 
For example, the economic value of ecotourism alone is enormous.
13 Scholes and Biggs
14 found 
that nature-based tourism in southern Africa accounts for more revenue than farming, fishing and 
forestry combined. A UN funded study The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) 
estimated that losses associated with the destruction of forests costs the world around $2.5 
trillion per year.
15 It is clear that preserving nature has quantifiable indirect economic benefits as 
well. A study by Markandya
16 et al. found that the precipitous decline in vultures in India has 
had substantial negative economic consequences including the increased costs of treating cattle 8 
 
for diseases, increasing costs of combating rabies in dogs, and many other costs. Documenting 
and publicizing the straightforward economic benefits of nature conservation can be an effective 
way to preserve specific environmental features. Even so, placing economic values on nature can 
be extremely difficult and can quickly lead to dubious estimates of value. For example, Boyles et 
al.
17 estimated the decline in populations of white nosed bats in North America could lead to 
agricultural losses of more than $3.7 billion per year. But the study ignores regional differences 
in crop production, land values, and bat distribution. Fisher and Naidoo
18:  
By ignoring this variation, the authors’ approach to calculating the economic value of bat 
services is tantamount to calculating the nations’ gross national product based on a county-
wide extrapolation of steal production in Pittsburgh. Boyles et al.’s extrapolation results in 
the remarkable claim that the value of pest regulation by bats is roughly 50% of the total 
crop value in states such as Montana, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Yet the 
predominant crop in the latter two states—hay—is a crop that Helicoverpa zea (the pest for 
which the original bat service values were calculated) does not affect. 
 
 It is understandable that those who wish to protect nature are eager to document the economic 
benefits of doing so. However, many of the attempts to monetize nature are so seriously flawed 
that they discredit the whole effort. 
III. The Efficient Market Assumptions Underlying Ecosystem Service Valuation  
  Many of the well-publicized attempts to value nature have been criticized for their faulty 
applications of standard methodology. Criticism of the underlying theoretical foundation of these 
studies has been less ambitious.  So-called “state of the art” methods to quantify economic values 
are based on assumptions that are rarely critically assessed in the studies that use them. 
Economic valuation models incorporate wildly unrealistic assumptions about the power and 
reality of our market economy and of human reason. Basing ecosystem valuation on discredited 
economic models gets us even further away from understanding the reality we need to change.
19 
Numerous questionable assumptions of microeconomic analysis underlie the belief that the 9 
 
market economy is capable of insuring the ‘ideal’ amount of ecosystem service provision. A few 
of these assumptions and the objections to them are: 
1. Features of the natural world can be correctly priced.  Some economists have argued it is 
impossible to meaningfully price irreplaceable natural resources for at least three reasons.  First, 
future generations cannot bid on exhaustible and irreplaceable resources therefore their true 
market value can never be known.
20 Secondly, we cannot correct this incomplete market since 
we cannot possibly know the preferences of future generations.
21 There is a general, although by 
no means unanimous, feeling among economists that the well-being of future generations should 
be given equal weight to the well-being of those living in the present, that is, the rate of pure 
time preference should be near zero.
22 This implies that future generations should be allowed to 
bid on exhaustible and irreplaceable resources but they cannot because they are not yet present, 
and there is no way for the current generation to bid for them since their preferences are 
unknowable.  Thirdly, ecosystems are so complex it is impossible to even describe them 
accurately much less reduce their value to a single number.
23 Norgaard
24 has pointed out that the 
use of the ecosystem service model has limited our understanding of complex ecosystems. 
Norgaard is critical of the influence of simplistic economic thinking on our understanding of rich 
and complex ecological relationships and complexity.  He is concerned that: 
[T]he implementation of the concept of ecosystem services has been on a project-by-
project basis within existing national and global institutional structure….Yet the driving 
motivation, from the initial use of the ecosystem metaphor to the implementation of PES 
[pricing ecosystem services] projects, has been to instigate significant institutional and 
consequent economic change in response to what are perceived to be very serious 
environmental problem generated by the economy we have.
25   
 
In his discussion of institutional change, however, Norgaard never questions the sanctity of the 
market economy, instead he advocates for understanding more fully how “markets and 10 
 
institutions work together.”
26 This is an interesting delineation since the market economy is itself 
an institutional arrangement.  
2. Other (non-ecosystem) prices are correct. This assumption is necessary since market choices 
depend on relative prices. If other prices are “wrong” because of market failures, out-of-
equilibrium conditions, or government subsidies (to the agriculture sector for example), then 
relative prices may not reflect “true” values even if ecosystem services are “correctly” priced. 
The Theory of the Second Best
27 tells us that in a general equilibrium framework correcting one 
market failure and leaving the others alone may actually move us further away from Pareto 
efficiency, the notion that well functioning markets allow us to reach a point where no one can 
be made better off without making someone else worse off.    
3. Consumers are self-regarding and narrowly rational. The ecosystem valuation approach must 
accept all the axioms of consumer choice to come to the conclusion that if ecosystem service 
prices are correct consumers will choose the socially optimal amount of these services. Social 
welfare is maximized by rational individuals expressing unfettered market choices. A large body 
of evidence suggests that people do not make economic decisions according to the economic 
definition of rationality.
28 A growing body of evidence on the “social brain” suggests that the 
model of Homo economicus strips away much of what makes us human.
29 The social nature of 
decision making calls into question the sanctity of individual-based market outcomes as an 
indicator of optimal social welfare.   
4. The value of ecosystem services in the future must be discounted. The standard economic 
model is essentially a financial investment model describing the rational investment strategy of 
an individual acting at a point in time (the immediate present). From the point of view of an 
individual something is worth less in the future than it is now. The value of ecosystem services 11 
 
must be discounted. Otherwise, since they last indefinitely, their value would approach infinity. 
The economic model values future states of the environment using a so-called social discount 
rate. But the discount rate is merely the individual discount rate adjusted for external effects.
30 
The social good is merely the sum of the well-being of self-regarding individuals. Valuation 
decisions are stripped of their social context. 
5. Scarcity is the reason ecosystems and their services are now in jeopardy.  Scarcity and market 
failure are the explanations of how we come to be in our particular circumstances. Market failure 
is offered as the explanation for why scarcity does not register in market prices.  Daily
31 claims 
that “For most of humankind’s experience on Earth, ecosystem capital was available in sufficient 
abundance, and human activities were sufficiently limited, that it was reasonable to think of 
ecosystems services as free.  Yet today, Nature everywhere is under siege.”  No one would argue 
against the notion that nature is under siege but the real explanation lies not in the relative 
scarcity of ‘natural capital’ but in our inability to fully comprehend the logic and dynamic of our 
economic system and how it has led us to this particular historical moment.   In a similar vein 
Robert Costanza was asked in a Wall Street Journal commentary:  “if ecosystems are worth more 
intact, why the heck are they being razed and paved?  And surely it can’t be true that leaving 
America the way Europeans found it would make it worth more today than with its highways, 
railroads, factories and cities.”
32 Costanza acknowledged that these past conversions benefitted 
society as a whole but claimed that we have now come to the point where the marginal value of 
nature, because there is so little of it left, is much higher.  Again relative scarcity is offered as the 
explanation.  But scarcity only tells us that things have shifted but doesn’t give us any 
information about “why?” and “how?” and these are precisely what we need to understand.   12 
 
  The above criticisms of the standard economic model are well known and it is tedious to 
have to keep repeating them. But the discredited assumptions of welfare economics refuse to die 
a natural death and as long as they continue to dominate our discourse they must be confronted.
33 
More importantly, we must move to construct an alternative way of understanding our 
predicament.   
 IV. Beyond Free Market Utopia: Recognizing both Proximate and Ultimate Causes of 
Environmental Destruction 
The distinction between ultimate and proximate causation stresses the need for two 
separate and complementary explanations for all products of genetic and cultural evolution. 
Ultimate causation explains why a given trait exists, compared to many other traits that could 
exist, based largely on the winnowing action of selection. Proximate causation explains how the 
trait exists in a mechanistic sense. For example, ecosystems are being degraded and biodiversity 
is being lost because their prices are too low (proximate cause) but more importantly because of 
the way industrial capitalism evolved in terms of production techniques dependent on fossil 
fuels, the concentration of economic and political power, population growth, and the culture of 
consumption (ultimate causation). It is especially important to recognize the many-to-one 
relationship between proximate and ultimate causation, whereby many functionally equivalent 
solutions can evolve in response to a given environmental challenge.
34 Failing to distinguish 
between the institutional configuration of an economy and its specific manifestations can result 
in the inability to understand the driving forces behind ecosystem loss.    
The literature concerning valuation reveals both a lack of concern about whether 
valuation is a satisfactory approach to conserving ecosystems and whether formidable if not 
insurmountable problems exist concerning the practical problems of valuation. In all the 13 
 
controversies there is a sense that once the particular problem of valuation is resolved (incorrect 
prices) the economic institutions we now have in place will prove reliable in providing an 
efficient amount of conservation. For example, Gretchen Daily claims that “major innovations to 
our economic and social institutions are needed” to capture the value of ecosystems and their 
services and “incorporate it into day-to-day decision making.” Daily continues “The main 
challenge in the pursuit of this goal is that most ecosystem services are currently treated as 
“public goods,” which if provided for one are provided for all, no matter who pays.”
35 This is a 
decidedly “market failure” approach—wrong choices are made because the market prices are 
incorrect.  The general principles delineated by Daily et al.
36 in the valuation of ecosystem 
services are: 1) public policy should be limited to non-revolutionary changes in the status quo 
(correcting for market failure), 2) values should be derived from aggregating individual 
preferences, and 3) these preferences should be revealed by observing actual behavior if 
possible.  Robert Costanza also recognizes natural capital as an asset that needs a “correct” price 
attached to it.  Costanza et al.
37 argue that the value of ecosystem services is best measured by 
the costs of replacement leading Paul Portney to argue “Equating nature with its replacement 
value is seductive, but from an economist’s perspective, a non sequitur. Something’s economic 
benefit is determined by how much people are willing to pay for it.”
38 Despite the debates about 
appropriate measures of value the solution to the goal of ecosystem service valuation is to 
capture the true prices of ecosystem services and incorporate them into day-to-day decision 
making. This is clearly viewed as the corrective measure.  
While we are sympathetic to using the price mechanism to discourage the over-
exploitation of nature, we claim that the ecosystem service approach deals only with proximate 
causes—it does not go far enough to get at the heart of the matter.  The loss of ecosystems and 14 
 
their services is not a problem that can be best understood or resolved in the context of market 
failure and finding the “correct” value of nature. The domain of institutional change must be 
entertained in a more dramatic way if we are to conserve the natural world through the great 
bubble of human economic activity embodied in the global economy.  Ecosystem service 
valuation is extremely limited as an approach to conservation and it reduces ecological 
complexity in a way that impairs our ability to understand ecosystems. Ecosystem complexity is 
reduced to an accounting of the service they render to the human economy and as the case of the 
bees indicate-----sometimes human substitution for these services is the best economic option. 
Moreover we are never led toward fundamental questions of economic organization with this 
framework. In an economic system built around the logic of profit and growth and the ongoing 
problem of stagnation (both secular and cyclical) resolvable only with more growth this seems 
extremely problematic. Valuation may in some limited and localized cases help to preserve 
ecosystems and their services but this approach to ecosystem preservation is no substitute for a 
critical look at our economic arrangements.  In order to understand the loss of ecosystems we 
must recognize the need to disengage from the imperialistic language of neoclassical economics 
and its ideological thrust and recognize that being “politic” is not necessarily the best approach 
to our momentous problem.   
    The purpose of economic activity throughout history is to reproduce the material 
existence of society but how this is done varies quite dramatically over time and space.  It is  
more enlightening to think about economic activity as a gradual process of domestication and 
simplification of ecosystems, a process that alters and remakes the human/nature relationship and 
then to concentrate more fully on the specific ways in which this process is unique and 
particularly pernicious under our economic arrangements. The economic methodology for 15 
 
valuing ecosystem services has no way to account for these differences in economic organization 
or for the more specific problems with our economic organization other than market failure and 
scarcity.  Natural capital and ecosystem services are not historically specific rather they are 
categories of analysis that have no sense of history nor the institutional embellishment necessary 
to understand the difference between Native Americans harvesting oysters and clams for 
subsistence, and commercial fishing for profit.   
The economies of the hunter/gatherer, feudal society and mature capitalism are very 
different.  What seems to be universal about economic activity is that it always and everywhere 
involves human intentionality interjected into the human/nature relationship.  The extent and 
purpose of that intentionality changes over time as does the way it is organized and its purpose.  
Sahlins
39 discussion of uneconomic man comes to mind---his wants are few and his resources are 
plenty because the technologies and the organization of his economy are very different than they 
are under global capitalism. It is a very different economic matter to manipulate the natural 
environment to feed and clothe a small band of people who want to limit their possessions to 
remain mobile than it is to produce, for profit, goods and services. That is, in an environment 
where accumulation is a necessity for economic survival, where economic expansion is 
constantly interrupted with periods of stagnation which themselves can only be resolved with 
growth and where the source of energy has been a robust endowment of fossil fuel whose waste 
products have accumulated in the atmosphere to an extent that a sixth great mass extinction is in 
motion.   The point here is that economic activity is always about human intentionality but the 
purpose and extent of that intentionality can and does change over time and our analyses should 
capture this fact.  16 
 
It is not clear that the loss of bees in Maoxian Province constitutes a loss in marginal 
value high enough to preserve bees.  In fact, the replacement of bees with human labor is worth it 
in both micro- and macroeconomic terms when viewed from the narrow perspective of 
ecosystem services.  One is inclined to quip---yes but there is an overabundance of labor in 
China shifting the relative value of scarce inputs from bees to humans. While this is true we 
should keep in mind that unemployment seems to be a chronic problem of advanced capitalism.   
Whether or not human existence is made better off without bees is another question entirely.  
And what the long term and integrated effectives of the loss of bees are on ecosystem integrity is 
also another question that may have little to do with our material reproduction narrowly 
construed.  
The natural capital approach to conservation is based on a financial investment model 
making “optimal” preservation of the natural world an outcome of economic self interest.  
Daily
40 makes this explicit: “Conservation can’t succeed by charity alone.  It has a fighting 
chance, however, with well-designed appeals to self-interest.” For Daily, conservation has its 
best chance if a price is attached to ecosystem capital and then markets are created to allocate. 
Garrett Hardin
41 made the same point in his rejection of appeal to conscience as an effective 
policy for population control. Hardin strongly condemned appeals to the common good: “But 
what is the meaning of the word ‘conscience? When we use the word responsibility in the 
absence of substantial sanctions, are we not trying to browbeat a free man in a commons into 
acting against his own self interest?”   
Ecosystem service valuation assumes that ecosystem services are valuable; that when 
bees disappear there is a cost that was not anticipated because it was never accounted for in the 
first place. But what happens when it makes economic sense to replace these services by humans 17 
 
anyway?  There are many instances in which human labor, intentionally applied, can substitute 
for services provided by nature.  And certainly, in the case where we want to rationalize 
production, human intentionality might be the best option.  The valuation of ecosystem services 
will never provide us with a clear picture of how to reconcile our economy with the ecological 
limits of the planet.  In fact, one could just as easily make the argument that in a mature market 
economy, plagued by unemployment and overproduction, a new service economy can be created 
by replacing ecosystem services by labor intensive, human intentionality wherever possible.   
V. The Alternative to Market Valuation: Saving the Bees by Recapturing the Commons   
What is it about our way of living and associated ways of thinking that puts so little value 
on the future of the planet? We argue above that a major reason is the narrow logic of the global 
market economy which values nature solely on its contribution to the discounted present value of 
economic activity. Following the logic of the market, the dominant economic model views the 
natural world from the financial investment perspective of an individual at a point in time. But 
the magnitude, suddenness, and long-term consequences of the current human abuse of the 
natural world calls for a radical new approach to economic organization, one based on a  “deeper 
sense of time.”
42  Such an approach would move beyond attempts to “correctly price” nature 
based on imputed market values and would instead rely on a more critical perspective on 
economic organization, a concern for future generations and an assessment of the right place of 
humans in the nonhuman world.  
This advice is of course “old hat” to environmental ethicists and the question remains 
“how do we do this?” How do we go beyond our preoccupation with “proximate solutions” (in 
this case tinkering with markets) to ultimate solutions (changing the institutions that govern our 
relationship to the natural world)? We might begin by acknowledging that humans lived 18 
 
sustainably as hunter-gatherers within the confines of local ecosystems for 95 per cent of our 
existence as a species. This is not a call to return to the past but rather an attempt to explore in a 
more full-bodied way what it means to live as humans in a ecologically and economically 
balanced way. In the past our well-being as a species depended directly on the sustainable use of 
local ecosystems. For a variety of reasons, including tapping into the stock of the earth’s stored 
carbon energy, we broke out of the confines of local ecosystems and convinced ourselves that we 
were somehow unconstrained by the evolutionary context—the web of life—that shaped us. We 
now find ourselves once again coming up against biophysical limitations, this time imposed by 
the entire finite planet.
43. We also come up against the prospect of leaving a dramatically 
diminished planet once we navigate our way through our present bubble.  
Over the past few decades reasoned public discourse and participatory democracy has 
been taken over by the let-the-market decide mentality. Bromley
44 describes this dynamic:  
Suddenly, it seems that public policy is not what we thought it was. Democracy as 
public participation and reasoned discourse is somehow suspect—not to be trusted. It 
seems that the public’s business cannot be properly conducted unless it adheres to the 
precepts of individualistic models of “rational choice” applied to collective action.  
 
The neoliberal public policy prescription is to set markets in motion and then let 
efficiency in allocation determine the socially optimal outcome. It is based both on an unrealistic 
notion of human behavior and an unrealistic notion of what the market economy is all about. In 
terms of the valuation of nature, this prescription requires only that prices be “correct” and that 
property rights are fully specified. Moreover, it moves “democracy” from “one person, one vote” 
to “one dollar, one vote”.  And as this happens social stability and environmental sustainability 
are eroded in the name of efficiency, individualism, and the belief that the market economy 
somehow channels individual choice into social welfare and is therefore sacred.    19 
 
Environmental valuation must capture the fact that human society is more than a 
collection of isolated individuals acting only in their narrowly defined self-interest. The market 
economy is no more the ‘natural order’ of society than another institutional arrangement. In 
contrast to the economic model, recent evidence from such diverse fields as anthropology, 
behavioural science, psychology, and neuroscience has established that humans are unique 
among mammals as to their degree of sociality.
45  This means there are clearly multitude ways of 
structuring society.  We have only to look at the example of the Kalahari Bushmen and their 
relationship to bees to know this is so. Laurens van der Post
46 tells us of the Bushmen “He loved 
honey with a passion that we, with a sweet-shop on every corner, cannot hope to 
understand....the taste of honey to the Bushman was like the light of the fire to his eye, and the 
warmth of its ruby flame in the black night of Africa.” Yet this desire for honey did not move the 
Bushman to domesticate and dominate the bee, rather it heightened his sense of observation and 
embeddedness so that the Bushman could follow a bee line to find out where a hive resided long 
after other individuals could no longer discern the flying bees in the distance.  The Bushman 
temporarily subdued the bees in order to steal some of their honey.  They valued the honey 
because it was wonderful and yes, scarce. Yet nowhere in this mix was there ever any question 
that Bushman would become bees.      
We are taught by the example of the Bushmen that in a different place and time and 
under different conditions the relationship between people and the natural world was decidedly 
different.  In the case of the Bushmen their keen sense of observation coupled with humility and 
imagination honed them to their surroundings and allowed them to reproduce a rich life in a 
place most of us would find uninhabitable.   In our image of what is to come we should not 
forget their example.  20 
 
Market valuation is an exercise for people who have lost all sense of ecological 
embeddedness.  This is us the global economic human of the 21
st century. Yet with a deep sense 
of time and an appreciation for the ability of humans to socially construct themselves it is not 
impossible to imagine other ways of relating to the natural world.  To do so means we have to let 
go of the language that imperializes our discourse and we have to understand our economic 
system for what it is and for the disastrous ecological balance that has ensued in its wake. This 
might point us in the direction of a more effective environmental policy design and it is an 
answer to libertarian-leaning environmentalists who subscribe to a narrow view of “choice.”
47   




1. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, 2010  
 
2. Ed Barbier, “Valuing Ecosystem Services as Productive Inputs,” Economic Policy, January 
(2007): 177-229; Gretchen Daily et al., “The Nature of Value and the Value of Nature,” Science 
289 (2000): 395-396; Geoffrey Heal, Nature and the Marketplace (Washington, DC: Island 
Press, 2000). 
  
3. Partha Dasgupta, “Nature in Economics,” Environmental and Resource Economics 39 (2008): 
1-7. 
 
4. Partha Dasgupta and Geoffrey. Heal, Economic Theory and Exhaustible Resources 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Heal, Nature and the Marketplace. 
5. Barbier, “Valuing Ecosystem Services,”; Partha Dasgupta and Karl Gören-Mäler, “Net 
National Product, Wealth and Social Well-Being,” Environment and Development Economics 5 
(2000): 69-93. 
 
6. Mick Common and Sigrid Stagl, Ecological Economics: An Introduction (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005; Robert Costanza et al., “The Value of the World’s Ecosystem 
Services and Natural Resources,” Nature 387 (1997): 253-260; Herman Daly and John Cobb Jr., 
For the Common Good. Redirecting the Economy Toward Community, the Environment, and a 
Sustainable Future (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994). 
 
7. Daily et al., “The Nature of Value,”; Stuart Pimm, “The Value of Everything,” Nature 387 
(1997): 231-232. 
 
8. Freya Matthews, “Planetary Collapse Disorder: The Honey Bee as Portent of the Limits of the 
Ethical,” Environmental Ethics 32 (2010): 353-367 argues that “The disappearance of honeybees 
is a portent not merely of physical demise, nor merely of ethical catastrophe, but something more 
ultimate: the unraveling of the larger context of meaning itself, the context in which ethics and 
even extinction can matter.”  
 
9. Niko Tinbergen, “On Aims and Methods in Ethology,” Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie 20 
(1963): 410–433. 
 
10. Robert Frodeman, “The Policy Turn in Environmental Ethics,” Environmental Ethics 28 
(2006): 3-20. 
 
11. Uma Partap, and Tej Partap, “Pollination of Apples in China,” Bees for Development Journal 
(September 2, 2005).  
 
12. Tracie Cone, “Tangerine Growers Tell Beekeepers to Buzz Off,” Associated Press, 
November 1, 2009. At http://www.seattlepi.com/national/395428_tangerines10.html 22 
 
13. A. Balmford, A., J. Beresford, J. Green, R. Naidoo, M. Walpole, A. Manica. “A Global 
Perspective on Trends in Nature-Based Tourism,” PLoS Biology 7 (2009): e1000144. 
Doi:101371/journal.pbio.1000144 
 
14. R. Scholes, R. and R. Biggs, Ecosystem Services in Southern Africa: A Regional Perspective 
(Pretoria: Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 2004). 
15. Pushpam Kumar, (editor) The Economics of Ecosystems  and Biodiversity: Ecological and 
Economic Foundations (London: Earthscan, 2010).  
 
16. A. Markandya, T. Taylor, A. Longo, M. Murty, S. Murty, K. Dhavala, “Counting the Cost of 
Vulture Decline—An Appraisal of the Human Health and Other Benefits of Vultures in India,” 
Ecological Economics 67 (2008): 194-204. 
 
17. J. Boyles, P. Cryan, G. McCracken, T. Kunz, “Economic Importance of Bats in Agriculture,” 
Science 332, (2011): 41-42. 
18. Brendan Fisher and Robin Naidoo, “Concerns about Extrapolating Right off the Bat,” 
Science 333, (2011): 287. 
 
 19. Jack Knetsch, “Gains, Losses, and the US-EPA Economic Analyses Guidelines: A 
Hazardous Product?” Environmental & Resource Economics 32 (2005): 91-112; Clive Spash, 
“Deliberative Monetary Valuation and the Evidence for a New Value Theory.” Land Economics 
84 (2008): 469-488. 
20. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, “Energy and Economic Myths,” Reprinted in Energy and 
Economic Myths (San Francisco: Pergamon Press 1976: 3-36). 
 
21. Arild Vatn and Daniel Bromley, “Choices without Prices without Apologies,” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 26 (1994): 129-48. 
22. Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge, UK,  
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
 
23. David Ehrenfield, “Why put a Value on Biodiversity? In Biodiversity, E.O. Wilson (ed), 
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988); Vernon Rull, “The Candid Approach,” 
EMBO Reports 11 (2010): 14-17. 
 
24. Richard Norgaard, “Ecosystem Services: From Eye-Opening Metaphor to Complexity 




26. Ibid., p. 1225. 
 23 
 
27. Robert Lipsey and Kevin Lancaster, “The General Theory of Second Best,” Review of 
Economic Studies 24 (1956): 11-32.  
 
28. John Gowdy, “Behavioral Economics and Climate Change Policy,” Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 68 (2008): 632-644; John Gowdy, “Terms and Concepts in 
Ecological Economics,” Wildlife Society Bulletin 28 (2000): 26-33. 
29. U. Frith and C. Frith, “The Social Brain: Allowing Humans to Boldly go where no other 
Species has Been,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 365 (2010): 165-175.  
30. Lisi Krall, L. and John Gowdy, “An Institutional and Evolutionary Critique of Natural 
Capital " In Toward an Integrated  Paradigm in Heterodox Economics – Alternative Approaches 
to the Current Eco-Social Crises. Rolf Steppacher and Julien-François Gerber (editors) (London:  
Palgrave-Macmillan, forthcoming). 
 
31. Daily, et al., “The Nature of Value”. 
 
32. S. Begley, “Furry Math? Market has Failed to Capture True Value of Nature,” Wall Street 
Journal, New York, N.Y., Aug 9, 2000. 
 
33. See John Quiggin, Zombie Economics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).  
 
34. David Sloan Wilson and John Gowdy, “The Relevance of Evolutionary Science for 
Economic Theory and Policy, “White paper for NSF SBE Program Initiative “Framing Research 
for 2020 and Beyond”, 2010, Available at http://evolution-institute.org/files/NSF-EvoEco-
White-Paper.pdf 
 
35. Gretchen Daily, The New Economy of Nature: The Quest to Make Conservation Profitable 
(Publisher 2002). 
 
 36. Daily et al., p. 356. 
 




39. Marshall Sahlins, “The Original Affluent Society,” In John Gowdy (editor), Limited Wants, 
Unlimited Means: A Reader on Hunter-Gatherer Economics and the Environment (Washington 
DC: Island Press, 1998).  
 
40. Daily, The New Economy of Nature, p. 12.  
 
41. Garret Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (1968): 1243-48.  
 
42. S. Wing, “We Need a Deeper Sense of Time,” Science 333 (2011): 825. 24 
 
  
43. Niles Eldredge, Dominion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).  
 
44. Daniel Bromley, “Environmental Regulations and the Problem of Sustainability: Moving 
Beyond ‘Market Failure’.” Ecological Economics 63 (2007), 677. 
45. B. Chapais, “The Deep Social Structure of Humankind,” Science 331 (2011): 1276-1277, 
Bruce Wexler, Brain and Culture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). 
 
46. Laurens van der Post, The Lost World of the Kalahari (New York: William Morrow and 
Company, (1958) 1966). 
 
47. Bryan Norton, “Review  of Mark Sagoff, Price, Principle and the Market,” Environmental 
Ethics 27 (2005): 319-322. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 